Rumour as Information: British Forces, Control, and Communication on the Indian North-West Frontier by Morton, Liam
University of Huddersfield Repository
Morton, Liam
Rumour as Information: British Forces, Control, and Communication on the Indian North-West 
Frontier
Original Citation
Morton, Liam (2015) Rumour as Information: British Forces, Control, and Communication on the 
Indian North-West Frontier. Identity papers: A journal of British and Irish studies, 1 (2). pp. 25-36. 
ISSN 2058-6205 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/26707/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Rumour as Information: British Forces, Control, and Communication on the 
Indian North-West Frontier 
 
Liam Morton 
King’s College London  
 
Abstract 
India during the nineteenth century was a rumour rich-society. For the British 
authorities these rumours were difficult to control and had the ability to weaken 
their prestige. This point was highlighted during the Frontier ‘Uprising’ of 1897 
when a British official ignored a report he had received because it contradicted his 
own information. The report of potential trouble proved to be correct. Rumours were 
also misunderstood with these misunderstandings connected to the authorities’ 
sources of information being inadequate. However, despite the inadequacy of 
information gathering, rumours were the only sources available for the authorities to 
make decisions. This illustrates the fragility of rule and the challenges that the 
officials on the Frontier encountered. The consequence of these shortfalls was that 
the British had to respond to events reactively and miscalculations were made. The 
paper will exemplify the importance of rumour on the Frontier through two case 
studies: The First Afghan War (1838–42) and the 1897 Frontier Uprising. These two 
examples, by setting original archival documents in their historical context, illustrate 
the extent to which rumours were free to circulate leading to responsive and ill-
prepared actions by the British. 
Key words: rumour, North-West Frontier, India, intelligence, information, 
Afghanistan, 1897 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The following paper will exemplify the importance of rumour on the Frontier during 
the nineteenth century for the British authorities. It will start by briefly looking at 
rumour in a historical context and the problems it caused the authorities it 
encountered. Next, the question of what a rumour is will be explored and definitions 
assigned to the term. Then the paper turns to the subject of information gathering on 
the North-West Frontier of India. This will be a chronological and historiographical 
account of the information gathering process on the Frontier and its interaction with 
rumour throughout the nineteenth century. The problems and difficulties the British 
authorities encountered and their attempts to combat these challenges will be 
explored. Finally, two case studies will be analysed to illustrate the importance of 
rumour to the Frontier.    
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What is a Rumour? 
 
Rumours have caused problems for officials and authorities throughout history. 
Ancient Rome was so plagued by rumours that the authorities appointed public 
‘rumour wardens’ called delatores, whose job was to mingle within large crowds and 
eavesdrop.  They then reported back to the authorities what they had heard in order 
that a counteroffensive could be launched through ‘official’ rumours (Allport & 
Postman, 1947: i). For the British, India was seen as an information- and rumour-rich 
society of which their authorities never managed to control the source (Bayley, 1996). 
Ralph Rosnow and Gary Fine argue that rumours are difficult, if not impossible, to 
control, and that it is frequently easier to start a rumour than to stop it (Rosnow & 
Fine, 1976: 11). Ben Hopkins argues that the ‘rumour’s power lay in its ability to 
erode British prestige’ (2008: 42). It is this that made rumour important on the 
Frontier and offers a way of thinking about the nature and limits of colonial power. 
The British authorities’ sources of information were deficient; they did not trust the 
local population, resulting in anxiety among officials who acted, as a result, 
responsively to events.  
So what is a rumour? The psychologist Robert Knapp in 1944 defined rumour 
as ‘a proposition for belief of topical reference disseminated without official 
verification’ (1944: 22). He continued to explain that a ‘rumor is but a special case of 
informal social communications, including myth, legend, and current humor. From 
myth and legend it is distinguished by its emphasis on the topical. Where humor is 
designed to provoke laughter, rumor begs for belief’. Gordon Allport and Leo 
Postman, both psychologists, in 1947 defined a rumour as being a ‘specific (or 
typical) proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word 
of mouth, without secure standards of evidence being present’ (ix). They even came 
up with an equation: r(umour) = i(mportance) x a(mbiguity). Both definitions given 
contained two important shared characteristics, the first being that a rumour is a 
‘proposition for belief’, i.e. a statement that expresses a judgement or opinion. The 
second shared characteristic was the emphasis placed on the fact that rumours were 
not substantiated. The social and cultural anthropologist Martin Sokefeld defines 
rumour in the British India context as a multidirectional, uncontrolled form of 
communication, effectively intervened in the British strategies of power, rendering 
their colonial informational regime in that area almost impotent (Sokefeld, 2002: 
299). Allport and Postman also proposed an interesting question, asking ‘is a rumour 
never true?’ (ix). They argued that all rumours contain a kernel of truth and that 
every rumour starts with something that has been perceived. This quality can be 
observed on the Indian Frontier where, for example, rumours of British intention to 
invade Afghanistan or enter a new Frontier region on the whole started from 
sightings of small troop movements. Russian advances in Central Asia circulated the 
bazaars as rumours of an impending invasion of India.  
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Another psychologist, Frederic Bartlett, in 1932 proposed what makes a good 
rumour in his work on memory.  By combining this and the work by Knapp five key 
concepts can be identified. 
 
I. Successful rumours are short and simple. 
II. A successful rumour becomes a ‘good story’. 
III. Names, numbers and places are typically the unstable components of any 
rumour. 
IV. The higher the authoritative source the more prestige a rumour has.  
V. For a successful rumour to thrive it must adapt to the immediate as well as to 
the traditional circumstances of the group.  
 
 
Information gathering on the Frontier 
 
As mentioned above, India was seen as an information and rumour rich-society. This 
links to Sokefeld’s argument that British policy toward the Northern Frontier of 
India was entangled in these rumours instead of (unavailable) reliable information 
(2002: 299; 311). The British government formally took over India in 1858 as a 
consequence of the events of the ‘Indian Revolt’ in 1857. Prior to this, it has been 
said, the most problematic form of information for the East India Company (the 
Company) was rumour (Hopkins, 2008: 41). Hopkins writes that this was due to the 
Mughal rulers exploiting and integrating rumour as a main tool of their governance. 
The Company’s failure to fully integrate rumour into its information order 
contrasted sharply with the Mughals abilities to exploit rumour. Hopkins continues 
to explain that, at one extreme, Company officials simply ignored it or refused to act 
upon it. At the other extreme was a kind of paranoia of the ‘dreaded moral effect’ of 
rumour, which the Company often demonstrated. That apprehension fed the talk of 
the bazaars, thus threatening the Company’s rule (Hopkins, 2008: 41). C. A. Bayly 
has famously used the notion of 'information panic' to describe the inability of the 
British to effectively gather and interpret information relating to indigenous 
practices and movements (Wagner, 2010: 24).  
For the authorities to be able to administer the Frontier they needed to receive 
the latest information and intelligence from outside its borders as well as through 
internal channels. The importance of the Frontier for the authorities was that it acted 
as a crossroads, a border zone where global forces were in play more than in other 
places at this time. External influences had the potential to use the Frontier to 
infiltrate India either directly or indirectly. Geographically, the North-West Frontier 
of India bordered Afghan territory, and in 1843 the British took over control of Sind. 
More importantly in territorial terms, the British annexed the Punjab in 1849 and so 
administered the Frontier using Lahore as it administration centre.  
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Initially, the Company under-invested in intelligence networks; by 1808–9 
they had employed news-writers in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat but by 1832 the 
number had not increased (Hopkins, 2008: 43). The Company also made use of the 
indigenous population as agents to support its European personnel. In the early 
years of the Company’s activities, where trade was the most important factor, 
information on south Asian textiles was particularly valuable and the Company’s 
main informants were Indian merchants and Indian employees of the Company. The 
information networks of the Mughal could easily be penetrated by those seeking 
inside knowledge of its inner-workings. When Bengal was transferred to British rule, 
the previous administration was not entirely destroyed. The Company’s large 
financial resources meant that they could buy their way into these networks. An 
example of this wealth was that skilled news-writers were paid as much as 300 
Rupees per month. A news-writer was also stationed in Kabul and the first, Karamat 
Ali, was expected to communicate with his superior in India at least once a month 
(Hanifi, 2011: 63). The process for the news-writers was that their reports were sent 
to a Political Agent (PA) based in India. The PAs then collated and edited the reports 
―usually forwarding to Calcutta what they deemed relevant rather than the whole 
report. However, this system was vulnerable to manipulation as PAs sometimes 
misquoted, ignored or even included their own views in the reports sent on to 
Calcutta (Hopkins, 2008: 43).   
In 1857, the need for information was crucial to help understand the uprising 
against the Company’s rule that was unfolding; rumour and 1857 are inevitably 
linked. The first rumour, that the grease on the Enfield cartridges consisted of the fat 
of pigs and cows, circulated in January 1857, from Dum Dum (Kolkata) (Wagner, 
2010: 29). However, this was a pre-emptive rumour as the sepoys had never actually 
seen the cartridges, meaning the finer details of the story were lost. But, the rumours 
were sufficient for the sepoys to object to them, no matter what concessions were 
made. In the end, the actual nature of the grease and of the paper was immaterial 
(Wagner, 2010: 51). Other rumours also circulated during 1857 which caused anxiety 
for the authorities and frustration for the sepoys. One in particular predicted an 
impending attack by British troops. For the sepoys, the only way they could respond 
to this rumour was as they had been trained to do (Wagner, 2010: 135). With all this 
misinformation circulating different parts of India, the authorities needed to gather 
all the intelligence they could. The method for gathering intelligence employed by 
William Muir, the magistrate of Agra, during this time was perhaps typical. His 
agents were well paid and deployed to observe the rebel lines and to maintain 
communications between separated columns. He used these reports to create a 
résumé of facts so understood as to dispel the rumours mentioned above that 
sapped British morale. His most reliable source was the news-writer for Gwalior, 
whose reports were passed directly to Agra (Bayly, 1996: 325). On the Frontier, 
Lieutenant Herbert Bruce, Inspector of Police for the North-West Province, 
attempted to counter rumours circulating the region during this difficult time for the 
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authorities. Bruce produced placards announcing British victories secretly posted up 
around Lucknow by his agents in an attempt to break the morale of the rebels.  
Colonel Thomas Pierce operating in Rajasthan during 1857 made it standard 
operational procedure not to act on any information unless it could be verified by at 
least two sources irrespective of their accuracy.1 However, misinformation and 
rumour found their way into official intelligence reports, as there was no solid 
procedure in place to check incoming information. The only method available was to 
check rumour against other rumours.  
Not only was getting any information at all a problem for the authorities, they 
also had concerns over its news-writers and informants when they could source 
information. One in particular was the ‘native agent’ in Afghanistan, who had been 
in Kabul for thirty years and, it was widely believed, had gone, in nineteenth-
century imperial parlance ‘so native as to be useless’.  Lord Salisbury in a letter to 
Prime Minister Disraeli on the subject of the ‘native agent’ commented that he 
‘writes exactly what the Ameer tells him’.2 Viscount Cranbrook suggested in a 
speech that the Indian Agent at the court of Kabul ‘spoke with the voice of the Amir 
and not his own’.3 This illustrated the problems of acquiring useful information on 
the Frontier. Not only were rumours mistrusted, so were the informants in British 
service. ‘Official’ information and rumour become harder to distinguish. However, 
later in the century Amir Abdur Rahman’s own news-writer at Kabul, Mirza 
Muhamed Yusuf Khan, was, in fact, in British pay and received between 12 and 20 
tomans a month. In the autumn of 1889 he was compromised and so no longer of use 
for the British.4 The British were not solely reliant on just one agent in the Afghan 
capital. The instructions from Henry Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the 
Government of India, to Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan, the British agent in Kabul, 
were to befriend the Amir and to watch for Russian spies or envoys. However, he 
was not favourably received and complained of Afghan intrigues against him.5  
An additional problem for the authorities was the interception of their agents’ 
reports. Major William Hodson described this as being a major difficulty in receiving 
up-to-date information from the field (Johnson, 2006: 80). However, the interception 
of hostile reports was a useful source of information for the British. One example 
illustrating this was when in 1848 a correspondence between the Sikh ruler and 
Kabul was intercepted. The letter contained a rumour that Queen Victoria had died 
without issue and that, as a result, ‘the English were in confusion’ (Johnson, 2006: 
89). If this had reached Kabul it would have been a powerful piece of propaganda, 
because 1848 was the year Britain was at war with the Sikh Empire. Any sign of 
perceived weakness on the British side could have potentially strengthened the Sikh 
Afghan alliance. However, the outcome of the Second Anglo-Sikh War was the 
annexation of the Punjab into British India; this particular rumour did not maintain 
the propagandist power it promised.  
Back in London, many in the Indian Office were skeptical about the reports 
coming in from India. They reckoned that such news about Afghanistan and Russian 
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intentions was ‘derived from the tales of native merchants and travellers, whose 
stories, magnified in the bazaars of the different cities through which they pass, 
reach India and Persia in a most distorted state, and gave rise to rumours utterly 
devoid of foundation’ (Beaver, 2012: 49). When one set of the ‘Cabul Diaries’ (diaries 
that the Agent in Kabul compiled based on reports he received) arrived in bulk in 
the India Office, an official wrote on the bundle: ‘These are copies of the latest Cabul 
Diaries: Implicit reliance cannot be placed upon them’.6 Salisbury also commented 
on these diaries, that ‘doubts have been thrown on their fidelity’.7 Salisbury strongly 
believed secret intelligence was essential for the formation and execution of external 
policy because of the unreliability of information from India. During the 1870s 
Britain collected intelligence in an ad hoc and amateur fashion.8 When Salisbury 
became Secretary of State for India in 1874, he immediately lobbied Viceroy 
Northbrook to improve intelligence in India. This pressure resulted in Northbrook 
taking more effective steps to collect intelligence beyond India’s frontier than 
virtually any other viceroy in history (Farris, 2005: 20). Salisbury ordered 
Northbrook to appoint native agents at Herat and Kandahar and a British agent at 
Kabul to gather information as ‘it is not to be expected that a Native Agent would be 
either able or willing to collect for your government’ (Beaver, 2012: 53).  
With Salisbury’s push, the Indian Army, with the support of Lord Roberts, 
eventually created an Intelligence Branch in 1878.9 One new development within the 
Branch was the use of war-gaming on paper as a tool for staff training. German 
general staff had first used war-gaming (Kriegspielen) on paper to test scenarios and 
the British soon followed suit (Beaver, 2012: 50). This was an important skill for 
testing reports and rumours. War-gaming allowed the Intelligence Department to 
analyse the types and sizes of units rumoured to be involved and apply to each ‘the 
amount of time it would take a military force of known composition to travel over a 
given distance of known terrain and weather patterns and arrive at a selected point 
in a battle-ready state’ (War Office, 1872). If the analysis indicated that the right units 
were not in the right place at the right time, the rumour remained a rumour (Beaver, 
2012: 50). Despite all these measures being put in place and an increase in reports 
flooding in, it was still a difficult task to accurately interpret the information 
correctly. However, what this does say about the authorities’ approach to rumour is 
that they took them seriously enough to analyse what they received. This shows the 
process of how rumour became information for the British on the Frontier. 
Despite the attempted improvements instigated by Salisbury during the 
1870s, problems still existed in the 1880s and 1890s. Major-General Henry 
Brackenbury, future Director of Military Intelligence, was informed of the 
inadequacies of intelligence gathering by Major-General Edward Chapman, who 
stated that, ‘our means of communications, through newspapers reporting to our 
agents in Persia, and in Peshawar and Quetta, is an old and worn-out 
arrangement’.10 Brackenbury agreed and informed the Viceroy, the Marques of 
Lansdowne, that ‘the reports of our news-writers are the cause of much unnecessary 
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alarm in this country ... When I was at the War Office, I had repeatedly to call 
attention to the reckless way in which they accepted the news-writers’ reports as 
Gospel’.11 For the Frontier, accepting or dismissing reports could have serious 
repercussions. A rumour stating potential trouble could have set in motion a move 
forward into new territory by the authorities. The consequence of these moves was 
to be the employment of an unplanned pacification approach in the region. So, if a 
rumour is believed and found to be true, it becomes information. If it is believed and 
found to be false, this credence is reckless. If it is disbelieved and found to be true 
this is also reckless. It seems as if rumour hangs constantly in the balance, 
threatening the person who receives it.    
Occasionally there were more useful pieces of counter-intelligence being 
recorded. For example, Peshawar reported that the Amir had a spy, Mustan Shah, at 
Simla in August 1888, and he was consequently put under close observation.12 In 
1891, the Herati news-writer, Khan Bahadur Mirza Yakub Ali Khan, recorded that a 
letter from General Kuropatkin, Russian governor of the Transcaspian Region and 
author of Schemes for the Invasion of India in 1888, had been intercepted. However, 
Brackenbury continued to be exasperated by methods of intelligence gathering in 
India. He had been particularly concerned by the absence of filtering of the 
information and the failures of verification, which tended to foster war (Johnson, 
2006: 215). Major Cecil East, the Intelligence Department’s Executive Officer, on the 
same subject commented in 1880: ‘If we were kept accurately informed of the state of 
affairs in those regions the Government would be at once able to dispel the 
discreditable state of alarm into which this country is periodically thrown by 
rumours of Russian expeditions against Herat or Northern Afghanistan’.13 
 
 
First Afghan War (1838–42)  
 
It could be argued that the British authorities in commencing military actions against 
Afghanistan did so as a result of rumour. By the mid-1830s it was believed among 
British authorities that their empire would be endangered by Russia without a 
vigorous assertion of British power and influence in Asia. Lord Palmerston, Foreign 
Secretary, began his campaign against this Russian ‘threat’ by energetically 
contesting Russian influence throughout western and central Asia and in the capitals 
of Europe. Palmerston and Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India (1836–42), 
agreed that it was too dangerous to rely on the uncertain friendship of either a Sikh 
or an Afghan empire. This became a major concern when a rumour began circulating 
that an envoy of Ranjit Singh had reached St Petersburg to begin discussions with 
the Czar.  If true, it would have been a huge blow to security on the Frontier as at 
this time the relationship between the Sikh Empire and Britain was fraught. It was 
decided that the best policy to follow was that each prince in the region should be 
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made to feel that his security depended on British support, so that the British could 
rely on closer ties with the Panjab, Sind and a soon-to-be united Afghanistan.  
It was decided in 1837 that William Burns should be sent to the court of Dost 
Muhammad Khan to secure an alliance against Russia. Dost Muhammad agreed in 
principle, but with the disclaimer that Britain should help the Afghans regain control 
of Peshawar from the Sikhs. However, with the British trying to follow the policy of 
friendly relations with Ranjit Singh it was not a state the British were willing to 
alienate. Consequently, the negotiations with Dost Muhammad stalled and it was 
decided that the next step was to replace him as ruler. Shah Shuja had previously 
ruled Afghanistan from 1803 to 1809, before being deposed by Dost Muhammad. 
The suggestion now was that he should be reinstalled on the Afghan throne. He 
would, to all intents and purposes, sit as the puppet ruler of an Anglo-friendly 
buffer zone. With the British rebuff, Dost Muhammad turned to Russia for 
assistance. At the same time as Burns, a rumour circulated causing anxiety among 
the British authorities that a Russian envoy had arrived at court in Kabul. 
The envoy was allegedly a Russian solider, who was believed to be carrying 
an unsigned letter supposedly from the Czar to start up commercial relations with 
Afghanistan. It was rumoured that Dost Muhammad started negotiations with him; 
however, once St Petersburg became aware of these negotiations, he was recalled. 
However, the Indian Office did not trust this information and Sir Henry 
Montgomery wrote: ‘I should like to know through what medium the Cabul news is 
received. The Intelligence I have seen for the last two years is the utmost rubbish … 
manufactured from bazaar gossip … in Peshawar’.14 I would suggest that due to the 
constant flow of rumours received by the authorities, reports like this one were 
routinely ignored. However, by October 1878, authorities in India were convinced 
that the Russians intended to advance on India through Afghanistan. The 
uncertainty over the information it received was enough to increase the fear levels in 
London and Calcutta. The British invaded in December 1838 and after a succession 
of British-led victories, Shah Shuja entered Kabul in August 1839. The invasion was 
enacted as a result of ignoring rumours and the authorities solely relying on their 
own information sources.   
 
 
1897 Uprising  
 
1897 was a challenging year for the British authorities in administering the Frontier. 
There was a significant ‘uprising’ that caused the British authorities to respond in 
numerous regions along the Frontier. Furthermore, rumours circulated that 
complicated matters. In early 1897, officials in Swat and Dir received information 
that rumours were circulating the bazaars that trouble was on the horizon for the 
authorities. Major Harold Deane, Political Agent of the Malakand, believed that such 
rumours were somewhat exaggerated. He, like many officials, perceived Frontier 
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rumours as merely fictitious and preferred his own limited information sources. One 
such source championed by Deane dispelled the troubles in Swat as part of a 
widespread outbreak of unrest.15 By early July, the political agent commented that 
the hostile conditions had broken up and the horizon seemed clear. Furthermore, 
British officials had been reporting to their seniors improved relations in the Swat 
Valley.  On 26 July, British officers from Malakand and Chakdara met at Khar to 
play polo (Swinson, 1967: 234). It was only after dark that it became apparent to the 
officers that the rumours were, in fact, true. Mullah Saidullah and his supporters 
numbering around 5,000 had attacked the British forts at Chakdara and Malakand 
(Tripodi, 2011: 87). The British authorities were unprepared. The Viceroy wrote to 
the Secretary of State for India the following day, that ‘the news from the Malakand 
this morning came as an entire surprise.’ Elgin continued, ‘we had been in 
communication with Major Deane lately … I believe a report is actually on its way 
telling of their friendly character’.16 
A few days later, on the 4 August 1897, Richard Udny, Commissioner of 
Peshawar, had received a report from the deputy commissioner in Kohat that a 
section of the Orakzais and Afridis tribes were being persuaded to raise a lashkar 
against the British in the region (Elliott, 1968: 195). As this conflicted with his own 
information, he decided to ignore it and subsequently sent a communiqué to the 
Government of India that ‘everything quiet. Reliable sources indicate that Afridis are 
unaffected’. However, the following day, news had reached him that a lashkar had in 
fact left Tirah the previous day. It was reported that Mulla Sayed Akbar and 1,500 
mullahs plus 10,000 Afridis had set off. On their advance through Tirah country it 
was recorded that both the Orakzais and Southern Afridi tribes, numbering up to 
40,000 to 50,000 men, had joined them (Allen, 2006: 228). Their target was the 
‘forward fortification’ of the Khyber posts held by the Khyber Rifles, and on the 23 
August, these were soon taken.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, the authorities’ responses in 1897 perfectly illustrate how rumours 
were not controlled and that their sources of information were inadequate to 
administer the global and geopolitical Frontier effectively. However, despite the 
inadequacy of information gathering, rumours were the only sources available for 
the authorities to make decisions. This illustrates the fragility of rule and the 
challenges that the officials on the Frontier encountered. The consequence of these 
shortfalls was that the British had to respond to events reactively and 
miscalculations were made. A major reason as to why this was the case is down to 
the constant flow of rumours received by the authorities.  With the officials being 
inundated with these rumours, many of the reports produced were routinely 
ignored with some favouring their own information sources.  
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Notes 
 
1. BL/Add. MSS. 42,500, Colonel Thomas Pierce Papers, (1857) pp. 46, 48 and 67. 
2. Salisbury to Disraeli, 2 January 1875, cited in Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of 
Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (1921), II, p. 3.  
3. Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Hansard, House of Lords 
Debate, 9 December 1878, vol. 243, cc234-35. 
4. IOR/L/P&S/3/297, India Office Records and Private Papers, British Library. 
5. IOR/L/P&S/7/63/1039, Durand to Afzal Khan, 14 July 1891, India Office 
Records and Private Papers, British Library. 
6. NA/FO/96/174, Memorandum (Morier) on cover of Kabul Diaries; vide also 
notes on Pollock’s despatches, 117-733, 18 May 1870. National Archives.  
7. NAI/Secret, No. 2, dated 22 January 1875, August 1875, No. 89. National 
Archives.  
8. T165/49, memorandum, ‘1922-23, Secret Service’. The Secret Service Fund 
(money paid primarily for the collection of intelligence abroad) during this 
decade was averaging £23,000 to £25,000 per year. National Archives.  
9. Rudyard Kipling’s conversation with Lord Roberts was critical in shaping the 
novel, Kim; deeply troubled by the potential of another popular uprising, 
Roberts believed that the Russian threat to India was the most important of 
his career. He produced no fewer than twenty reports on the Defence of India 
between 1877 and 1893, and he championed the creation and development of 
an Indian Intelligence Branch. Kipling’s Asian agents are all portrayed as 
directly linked to the British intelligence systems in India.  
10. NA/WO 106/16, Major General E. Chapman to Brackenbury, September 1892. 
National Archives.  
11. IOR/MS 113, Brackenbury Papers, Brackenbury to Lansdowne, 19 October 1892. 
India Office Records and Private Papers, British Library. 
12. IOR/L/P&S/7/55/175, Government of India to Indian Office, 29 August 1888. 
India Office Records and Private Papers, British Library. 
13. C-2811. Military Parliamentary Papers. C. J. East. Memorandum on our Future 
Policy in Afghanistan. No. 7. August 1880.  
14. IOR/L/P&S/3/25 (1878). India Office Records and Private Papers, British 
Library. 
15. IOR/L/PS/18/A131, Letter from the Government of India to Lord George 
Hamilton, 1 Sep 1897. Deane reported that in Swat, in his opinion, the danger 
of further trouble was removed. 
16. IOR/MSS EUR/F123, Hamilton Papers, Elgin to Hamilton, 27 July 1897. British 
Library.  
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